The EU's proxy war on refugees by Helen Hintjens (7187102) & Ali Bilgic (3591167)
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Accepted version
  
THE EU’S PROXY WAR ON REFUGEES 
Helen Hintjens and Ali Bilgic 
 
 
 
Abstract: For decades, European Union (EU) member states have fought an illegal proxy 
war – a form of state crime – against refugees and migrants, far beyond EU external 
borders. Fatalities make this proxy war equivalent to international classifications of war. 
To justify this war, migrants have progressively been reclassified by the EU as “illegal” or 
criminal. This article situates the proxy war within wider deterrence-based EU migration 
policies. Examples like the 2008–2009 Italy–Libya deal and 2016 EU–Turkey deal show 
the high price paid by refugees, minorities and the damage to the EU’s own stability and 
reputation. Forcibly confining people at “holding points” along migratory routes, expel- 
ling people to unsafe countries and raising barriers to legal movement, the violence of 
the proxy war became more visible in 2015. We conclude that far from counteracting the 
dynamics of mass displacement, the proxy war may have contributed to the recent crisis 
of refugee reception in Europe. 
Keywords: proxy war; refugees; EU; Turkey; Libya; deaths; Kurds; Mediterranean; 
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“Sorry, we simply can’t afford to save your life”, is said to the dying. The really sad part is 
that the excuse is not a lie, but the truth – so many are dying not because capitalism is 
failing but because it is succeeding, because it is fulfilling its logic – a fact that seems 
more and more visible today than at any other time in recent history. 
(Cazdyn 2007: 656) 
Since at least the early 1990s, a military logic has underpinned policies designed 
to dissuade migrants, including refugees, from moving towards, and into, the ter- 
ritories of European Union (EU) member states. Such policies are based on deter- 
rence, which can be defined as “. . . thwarting those seeking to land before they 
reach sovereign territory” (Mountz and Loyd 2013: 178). According to these 
authors, “(p)ractices that [are believed to] deter migrants include interception at 
sea, arrangements to return those intercepted, and detention of those making unau- 
thorized entry somewhere during the transnational journey” (Mountz and Loyd 
 
  
  
 
2013). As deterrence has become a more explicit policy goal, the “EU proxy war” 
has become more visible, and the need to end it more apparent. 
It can be noted that “Wars of aggression are, by far, the most destructive and desta- 
bilizing of all state crimes” (Kramer and Michalowski 2005: 446). We view the EU 
proxy war on refugees as a war of aggression, waged primarily through state proxies 
(see Mumford 2013). In this war, policies of exclusion within Europe are perpetually 
reinforced by violent containment “far away”. There are many different battlefields 
in this proxy war, which has potentially global reach and is being fought across the 
African continent, in South Asia and the Middle East, the Balkans and the Caucuses. 
Other versions of the proxy war are those of Israel, which now sells refugees from 
one African country to another, and Australia, which forces asylum seekers “off 
shore”. This article focuses solely on the EU, however, and suggests the proxy war on 
refugees may reflect some deeper EU problems of legitimacy (Mitzen 2018). 
That the threat of migration to the EU is imagined rather than actual does not 
mitigate the liability of EU member states for the fatal results of the proxy war. 
Their actions remain illegal and can be viewed as a form of state crime, as defined 
by Kramer and Michalowski (2005), and involving 
 
. . . any action that violates public international law, international criminal law, or 
domestic law when these actions are committed by individuals acting in official or 
covert capacity as agents of the state pursuant to expressed or implied orders of 
the state, or resulting from state failure to exercise due diligence over the actions 
of its agents. (447–448) 
 
When those in flight are shot by border guards, are raped and tortured, have their 
organs harvested, remain with untreated injuries and illnesses, or are allowed to 
drown in the ocean, this is all attributable to the proxy war. Indeed, the proxy war is 
what ensures that it is precisely those most entitled to seek state protection under 
international law, who are least likely to be able to receive it. The most desperate for 
sanctuary are systematically denied the basic human right to move to a place where 
they can expect the protection they are legally entitled to. Instead they are actively 
pursued by army and police, and by private gangs, and are persecuted on behalf of EU 
member states by their paid proxies, wherever they seek protection (Bilgic 2013; 
Grewcock 2010; Weber and Pickering 2011). 
EU member states’ preferred modus operandi has been to contractually tie allied 
states, whether in Africa, the Middle East or elsewhere, into a series of multi-lateral 
and bi-lateral agreements. These involve extending the geographical scope of EU 
policing, imposing exclusionary and deterrence-based measures, in exchange for 
development funding and “security sector” reform. This process of enlarging the 
geographical scope of EU migration management is not new, as Mitzen reminds us. 
 
  
  
 
As she also explains, it has more to do with the internal preoccupations of the EU 
than with any established threat from migrants or refugees. As she puts it, 
 
. . . this securitization, which began well before 9/11, has been an externalisation 
of internal security threats. Unemployment and crime have been primarily 
domestic problems. By expelling [these] . . . from the domestic and making it [the 
security threat] an alien thing brought in by outsiders . . . the EU bought some 
measure of cohesion. (Mitzen 2018: 407) 
 
This makes the very interesting point that internal difficulties in the EU are being 
projected onto migrants and states in the “Global South”. 
Some might suggest the EU is merely waging a war of words, a metaphorical 
war, like a “war on poverty” or a “war on corruption”. Yet, the evidence involves 
many thousands of casualties, and costs millions of Euros, feeding a growing secu- 
rity industry. In this way, the proxy war does great “social harm” to some of the 
weakest and most vulnerable people on the planet. The battlefronts of this proxy 
war now extend from the Sahel to the Balkans, and from the Canaries to Afghanistan. 
When deterrence has failed, the EU has even considered waging open warfare 
itself. Thus, in 2015, in response to the “migration crisis”, some EU member states 
set their sights on waging an open “war on smugglers”. The plan was that 
 
Fifteen ships, aircraft and drones from at least 10 EU countries will be used to 
monitor the activity of smuggling boats carrying migrants from Libya to Italy. Their 
mission will be to decide whether it will be possible to mount full-scale combat 
operations against the smugglers in future. (Kingsley 2015) 
 
Against this backdrop of militarism, we draw on our own work over several dec- 
ades as academics engaged with civil society to defend refugee rights, and work- 
ing with refugees’ self-organizations in countries as diverse as Uganda, Australia, 
Turkey, the UK, Rwanda, the Netherlands, France and Italy. Our engagement has 
informed our analysis of the proxy war on refugees as a state crime, constructed 
through the justificatory argument of a supposed threat of “invasion” by migrants 
and refugees. This is a classic case of securitization and has been considered 
elsewhere (Boswell 2007; contributors in Lazaridis and Wadia 2015). We pro- 
pose that the proxy war on refugees and migrants and direct military attacks on 
smugglers are both illegitimate and counterproductive. The various technologies 
of exclusion designed to deter migrants and asylum seekers, in practice, may do 
the opposite by forcing migrants and refugees ever onwards (Bilgic 2013; 
Hintjens et al. 2011). The proxy war brings regimes of military violence, mass 
human rights violations and overt state violence against residents, back into EU 
 
  
spaces, by the backdoor. Normalization of the use of violence against unarmed 
“enemies” has brought the idea of warfare closer, making it thinkable and less of 
a taboo (Mitzen 2018). The EU’s borders with Turkey are really not that far away 
from the spiralling proxy war in Syria; the possibility does arise that the EU or 
some of its member states could become embroiled in a direct, rather than a proxy 
war, fought on European soil. 
The proxy war is fluid since “. . . boundaries demarcating states, regions and 
territorial waters are at once sites of policing and containment . . . and sites of 
crossing and confusion” (Mountz and Loyd 2013: 176; see also Migreurop 2007). 
Although violence inflicted on migrants and refugees by a proxy is meant to pre- 
vent those people reaching the EU, recently, deaths on the way have started to be 
better documented (International Organization for Migration [IOM] 2014, 2017). 
In this article, we first consider the meaning of “proxy war”, linking it with con- 
tainment and deterrence. We highlight the resurgence of Turkish army attacks on 
Kurds, following the EU–Turkey agreement. We examine some examples of 
agreements between the EU and third countries located along migrant routes, such 
as Libya and Turkey. We suggest that by “turning a blind eye” to violent persecu- 
tion and future peace within the EU, the EU and its member states have generated 
doubts around the supposed foundation of the entire EU project, which was con- 
structed on the premise of a “liberal” form of peace designed to avoid statelessness 
(Mitzen 2018; for the surprisingly similar Australian case, see Grewcock 2010). 
 
Why “Proxy War”? 
The term “proxy war” is surprisingly rare in the academic literature, in view of the 
prevalence of the phenomenon of proxy war in reality. It is used to refer to situa- 
tions such as Ukraine or Syria, where several external parties are fighting one 
another indirectly, by backing local allies, or proxies whom they also arm and fund 
(Hughes 2014). In “proxy wars”, the external actor provides arms, logistical sup- 
port and even moral justifications which seek to make the war appear legitimate. 
Geraint Hughes (2014) notes that proxy war is often based on “a prevalence of 
direct assistance, the existence of a common enemy and the maintaining of the 
relationship for a certain period of time” (105). Mumford (2013) defines proxy 
war as “. . . indirect engagement in a conflict by third parties wishing to influence 
its strategic outcome” (40). Paffenroth (2014) talks of “outsourcing conflict”, 
referring to the frequency with which private actors such as security companies 
are involved in today’s wars. Whilst some level of agreement on a common enemy 
helps cement the proxy war relationship, as already mentioned, these relations can 
also be based on loose and pragmatic alliances, for instance, grounded in mutual 
financial interests or on transactional ties. 
 
  
  
 
Arguably, in the case of the EU, a low-level proxy war on people in flight, refu- 
gees and migrants started at least twenty years ago, or more, and has since intensi- 
fied (Andersson 2012; Migreurop 2007; Mountz and Loyd 2013). The 
externalization of EU border controls through multi-lateral “Eurosur” deals across 
the Mediterranean and through bi-lateral intergovernmental agreements, for exam- 
ple, between Libya and Italy, represents a pragmatic form of “development condi- 
tionality”. Under such arrangements, “. . . in return for financial aid, non-EU 
countries hold back irregular migrants and prevent their entry into European ter- 
ritories” (Palladino and Gjergji 2016: 3). Ultimate responsibility rests with the 
“commissioning” EU states, who could in future find themselves accused of state 
crimes. The routinization of such policies is no guarantee that human rights viola- 
tions will be viewed as legitimate in the future. As one key study noted, 
 
. . . the key point about state crime in liberal democracies is that it is not aberrant 
or anomalous, and has no clear boundaries, but shades imperceptibly into the 
routine, “legitimate” activities of the state. (Green and Ward 2000: 103) 
 
In such a context, as they explain, emergency “. . . has become the norm” and 
is used to justify human rights abuses that would not “normally” be viewed as 
acceptable (Green and Ward 2000). Grewcock has shown similar processes of 
normalization of state crime, visible in what has been termed the “Australian 
solution” of externalized border controls. Since the late 1990s, Australian 
Immigration Services have been training EU border agencies in how to achieve 
this goal, if not legitimately, then at least legally (Grewcock 2010; Hintjens and 
Jarman 2003). Also since the 1990s, the Australian government has paid 
selected governments in the Global South to detain, apprehend and even forci- 
bly deport those considered undesirable migrants, such as failed asylum seek- 
ers, and those criminalized as “illegal” (Mountz and Loyd 2013). What Frances 
Webber (2017) recently coined “Europe’s Unknown War”, is here termed the 
EU’s Proxy War. Michael Grewcock (2010) has termed this, in another setting, 
“Australia’s ‘War’ on Illicit Migrants”. Webber and Grewcock’s formulations 
bear a close resemblance to ours and reassure us that our interpretation of deter- 
rence policies as a form of warfare, through externalized policies that we define 
as both proxy war and forms of state crime by proxy are not exaggerated 
(Grewcock 2010; Webber 2017). When an earlier version of this article was 
presented in 2015, we were advised to replace “proxy war” with less blunt 
expressions like “externalised violence” or “violent containment”. However, 
we remain convinced that this proxy war needs to be named for what it is, a war 
waged for decades, which has only quite recently become visible to wider EU 
publics and which, prior to 2015, was largely “out of sight, out of mind”. 
 
  
  
When the EU’s deal with Turkey was signed in 2016, 6 billion Euros were 
promised, of which around 3 billion Euros had been paid to the Turkish govern- 
ment by the end of 2017, ostensibly so that half a million Syrian children could 
attend school. “Within weeks, irregular migration dropped to pre-crisis levels 
demonstrating that Turkey had the capacity to control its western sea borders” 
(Düvell 2018: 229). Logically, therefore, Turkey could also open its borders and 
allow refugees back into Greece and the EU. In exchange for Turkey accepting 
Syrians deported from Greece, the EU removed most visa restrictions on Turkish 
nationals and agreed to revisit future Turkish-EU membership. The core of the 
deal was to regularize mass forced returns of Syrians and non-Syrian refugees and 
migrants to Turkey. This rested on the claim that Turkey was a “safe” third coun- 
try of temporary settlement for the refugees. The surge in Turkish state violence 
against minorities in 2017 and 2018, which we present in more detail in a later 
section of this article, challenges the claim that Turkey was a safe country in the 
first place. The EU has stood by in the face of arrests of political opposition and 
innocent bystanders, Kurdish communities, social movement activists, academics 
and other independent social forces in Turkey. For such reasons, the EU deal with 
Turkey has been widely criticized. Yet, this deal is very much in line with the 
proxy war, which now spans a wide inter-regional arc far beyond the southern and 
eastern perimeters of the EU and has been waged for decades. 
The EU proxy war on refugees and migrants has produced many avoidable 
casualties, though there are no means to determine precisely how many people die 
annually as a result of the proxy war. Migrant and refugee deaths are not officially 
recorded by any state or private agency, and the rough estimates available to us are 
based almost entirely on media reports, collected by a number of NGOs and inde- 
pendent researchers (Edkins 2016; Grant 2011). One study explains that “As a 
result of the paucity of official statistics, UNITED’s List of Deaths and the Fortress 
Europe blog . . . remained the primary sources of data on border-related deaths in 
the Mediterranean” (Last and Spijkerbroek 2015: 96). The UNITED list is the 
longest established and has most recently been discussed in The Guardian but 
only concerns deaths inside and around the immediate borders of European terri- 
tories (McIntyre and Rice-Oxley 2018). As of 5 May 2018, the list had recorded 
34,361 deaths – some identified and some not – since counting started in 1993. 
This list was of all murders and deaths in transit and all deaths and suicides of 
asylum seekers, refugees and undocumented people who had already arrived in 
the EU and Switzerland. One early entry for 1993 notes that a Turkish man of 43 
years set himself on fire and died in Croydon Immigration office in the UK on 16 
March 1993. Cross-Mediterranean deaths are also included in the list.1 
Unfortunately, no similarly detailed list of deaths exists for those who die on their 
way to the EU, for instance in Libya, Albania, Turkey, Egypt, Morocco or Chad. 
  
  
 
Instead, we have IOM estimates of deaths, of the IOM, which tend to be more 
conservative and focus on the Mediterranean. According to IOM, in 2015, 5,350 
migrants died in the Mediterranean compared with 5,146 in 2016 and 3,119 in 
2017 (IOM 2018). In the very first month of 2018, the death toll was nearly 343, 
in spite of winter weather that usually restricts the number of sea crossings. These 
numbers do not include those who died or were killed in the Sahara, or on the 
journey trying to reach the point where they crossed by sea to Europe. 
If the battlefront is human beings moving, then the deaths annually recorded in 
this proxy war are well above the PRIO/Uppsala conflict database’s threshold for 
war, which is “(a)t least 1000 battle-related deaths in one calendar year” (UCDP 
website n.d.). Yet, migrant and refugee deaths are not recorded in any of the major 
war and conflict databases collected by scholars in Northern European universities 
(e.g. PRIO in Oslo, Uppsala and Heidelberg). This is despite evidence, according 
to Richard Danziger, IOM Director for West and Central Africa, for example, that 
the number who die en route, for example, in the Sahara are “. . . at least double 
those who die in the Mediterranean. But we really have no evidence of that, it’s 
just an assumption. We just don’t know” (Miles and Nebehay 2017). 
What is quite apparent is that most such deaths are quite avoidable and predict- 
able. They result mainly from the direct and indirect forms of violence visited 
upon the bodies of migrants and refugees, whether at sea, in deserts, in detention 
centres or in Libya’s illegal prisons and slave markets. Weber and Pickering 
(2011) put this in starkly simple terms: 
 
We argue that people die because of the ways in which the borders between the 
Global North and the Global South are controlled. These deaths are often 
foreseeable and can occur by deliberate act or omission. (1) 
 
Through outsourced proxy warfare, a one-sided form of state-sanctioned violence 
frames EU states themselves, and their borders, as vulnerable entities to be pro- 
tected from the threatening bodies of the migrants and refugees (Mitzen 2018). 
Those who die in the Sahara or whilst crossing the Aegean or Mediterranean are 
as much victims of a proxy war as those who are killed in Ukraine and in Syria as 
foreign-backed forces battle it out with one another, all proxies for external actors 
who prefer to remain invisible. 
 
Proxy War = Deterrence + Containment 
Drawing on the work of Mark Duffield, we suggest that a proxy war is being 
fought over refugees and migrants moving towards the EU. The proxies are other 
states, such as Libya, Morocco, Turkey and other EU partners further afield, such 
 
  
  
 
as South Africa or Nigeria. Underpinning the proxy war is a twin logic. The first 
element of deterrence, already discussed at the start of this article, is combined 
with the element of containment (Duffield 2007). Both operate according to mili- 
tarized and spatially colonial principles since specific categories of human beings 
are excluded from protection and are confined forcibly to certain spaces consid- 
ered “suitable” for them. Deterrence and containment combine direct and indirect 
violence, laws and media and public perceptions of threat. Direct violence mostly 
takes the form of the potentially lethal use of force to detain and expel migrants 
and refugees back across borders. Indirect violence can be even more lethal and 
results in hunger, neglect, robbery and diseases, all of which can be fatal for those 
stranded and immobilized, contained. 
Deterrence and containment are like a pincer movement around migrants 
who become illegalized (Last and Spijkerbroek 2015) through an “illegality 
industry” that operates well beyond EU borders (Andersson 2012). Through 
this process of being placed outside the law, most refugees find themselves 
confined to often hostile and nervous neighbouring countries in their home 
regions. Those who decide to move on are forced to embark on dangerous and 
sometimes deadly journeys, across the EU–African or Turkish–EU regions, 
towards what seem to be safer zones and countries. Crossing borders through 
maritime waters and deserts, refugees are more vulnerable at each successive 
stage of their harrowing journeys as they hand over more and more money to 
move. These journeys have been depicted in a number of films, where they can 
be represented as forms of resistance to border policing and screening out of 
certain kinds of human beings through deportations and refusals of asylum 
(Hintjens 2016; Palladino and Gjergji 2016). At this level, Europe “functions as 
a scale whose construction holds dire material consequences for those embark- 
ing on often perilous journeys to move from one place in the region to another” 
(Mountz and Loyd 2013: 177). 
Since Western Europe is still much safer than Syria, or Turkey, even violence – 
through proxy war – may increase the pressure to leave Turkey or Libya and move 
on to the EU to escape violence. Deterrence through proxy war may add pressure on 
refugees to flee danger along the route and continue their journeys in the hope of 
finding less “hostile environments”. Those who travel involuntarily will not be eas- 
ily deterred since lethal violence is their main “push” factor. Outright proxy warfare 
against potential refugees – as in Turkey’s border region with Syria today or as 
previously in Libya – will tend to produce “backwash” effects by generating more 
rather than less pressure on those in transit to move on. The EU has a limited capac- 
ity to enforce exclusion from its own borders through violent means, without the 
support of proxy states. And yet containment will become more contested through 
law, the more violently it is imposed and policed. 
 
  
  
 
The outer perimeter of the EU’s Schengen zone can never be sealed against all 
newcomers except by locking inside all those who one day hope to become regu- 
larized, get nationality and travel. As Eurosur partners continue to wage proxy war 
against “illegal” human migration through policing of their Southern borders and 
territorial waters, bona fide refugees are pushed back (Andersson 2012; Weber 
and Pickering 2011). In Libya, for example, mistreatment of refugees and migrants 
started well before the end of Ghaddafi’s regime. In 2007, a treaty was cynically 
 
Signed by former Libyan dictator Gaddafi and Italy’s prime minister Berlusconi in 
a tent near Benghazi . . . [and] presented as a turning point in the shared colonial 
history of Italy and Libya. Berlusconi’s solemn apology for Italy’s colonial enterprise 
in the early twentieth century allegedly marked the beginning of a new course. 
(Palladino and Gjergji 2016: 3) 
 
Apart from Germany, EU member states have shown more concern to avoid 
responsibility for refugees than to protect them. In a bizarre show of bravado, some 
EU politicians appear to be competing with one another to present an “inhuman” 
face to their domestic electorates. Refugee status, if granted to the handful who 
make it to that stage, is almost always temporary. Refugee status can be revoked if 
the home country is judged (often wrongly) as “safe to return to”. Even if today the 
refugee camps of Kenya, Bangladesh or Jordan were closed by force, renewed 
warfare over water and other resources would push up refugee numbers in future, 
and worldwide. Having abandoned their short-lived belief in human rights as 
guidelines for actions and policies, EU member states appear to be abandoning 
even the foundation of the EU’s existence, namely, the shared desire for peace. EU 
heavy industries remain to serve powerfully militaristic ends, and peaceful eco- 
nomic development is as distant a prospect in Europe today as it is in the US. 
Reflecting on the EU as a zone of (in)security, Mitzen (2018) comments that 
 
. . . the EU’s distinctiveness as an actor on the world stage is due in large part to its 
success at producing its long peace. But the mechanisms producing that peace  
are primitive modes of anxiety management. (394) 
 
The neglect of rescue at sea, and expulsions that result in predictable deaths, for 
instance, may come to be seen as forms of war crimes, and certainly as criminal 
acts that violate both the Law of the Seas and the Refugee Convention, which 
explicitly rules out judging a refugee for not having the correct papers. According 
to the courts, pushbacks in The Mediterranean violated this ban. In light of the Hirsi 
Jamaa case and other similar rulings, EU governments should start to acknowl- 
edge that their security operations under FRONTEX, for example, are more like 
 
  
  
 
failed military operations than legitimate and legal border control measures 
(Palladino and Gjergji 2016). None of the many acts of individual and group vio- 
lence that make up the proxy war do anything to solve the original problems that 
force people to leave their countries, including civil wars and environmental inse- 
curities that produce refugees and forced migrants in the first place. 
Ironically, before 2015, EU member states agreed to prevent such expulsion of 
refugees prior to hearing their asylum claims. In their haste to blame smugglers for 
rising refugee arrivals, however, and in the euphoria of the new proxy war being 
fought by Turkey, the EU Asylum Procedures Directive (APD) of 21 June 2015 
was forgotten. The APD asserted the right of non-refoulement (non-return) and 
proposed that it should be robustly defended for all those claiming asylum, any- 
where in the EU. Article 6 of the APD provided that asylum claims had to be 
registered at the first opportunity, in any EU state. Article 8 states, 
 
. . . training must be provided to officials who may come into contact with persons 
seeking international protection (in particular during the surveillance of land or 
maritime borders or during border checks) so that they are able, inter alia, to 
provide information on where and how an application can be lodged. 
 
Most officials who meet undocumented migrants either are not trained in these 
provisions or are trained not to let asylum applicants know their rights in this way. 
The APD which was so sorely needed in 2015, and appeared all but forgotten in 
the rush to prevent migrants from arriving by land and sea at Europe’s borders. 
 
EU Migrant Crisis: The Proxy War Made Visible 
With the crisis of irregular migration intensifying in 2014 and 2015, EU member 
states’ proxy war on refugees gradually came into the daylight, becoming more 
visible. As thousands died at sea, especially in the Eastern Mediterranean, most 
from countries at war, especially Syria, Eritrea and Afghanistan, these preventable 
deaths of “innocent families” started to be blamed on smugglers and traffickers. 
Draconian EU immigration policies, rooted in deterrence principles, tried to con- 
trol the flight of people out of war-torn Somalia, Iraq, the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (DRC), Afghanistan, Eritrea and Syria. As they travelled the routes that 
passed through Turkey, Libya, Morocco, the Caucuses, Eastern Europe and even 
Russia, the passage of refugees was violently blocked off, with walls, with polic- 
ing and with other physical and legal barriers. 
A particularly cynical example of proxy war on irregular migrants followed the 
2008 Benghazi Accords between Libya, Italy, the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization  (NATO).  Under  this  agreement,  the  Italian  government  would 
 
  
 
compensate the Libyan government for damage done to Libya by Italy during the 
Fascist military occupation of the inter-war and war years. In return, Ghaddafi’s 
regime would “get tough” with those defined as illegal migrants, fleeing through 
Libya to Europe: 
 
Italy promised to help start development projects in Libya and the countries of 
origin of irregular immigration with EU funds while Libya was to reach agreements 
with these same countries to reduce irregular migration and to accept the 
repatriation of migrants. (Pace 2013: 13) 
 
This agreement prefigured the EU–Turkey deal some years later, and both sets of 
agreements between the EU and its partners showed the same disregard for human 
rights norms, especially for non-refoulement principles, core to the 1951 Refugee 
Convention. Soon both Libya and Italy started to forcibly deport thousands of Africans 
south, including into the Saharan desert. Even those with refugee status, who had filed 
bona fide asylum claims with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), were not immune from such mass expulsions. 
What is now the worst refugee crisis since the Second World War has not been 
helped by the proxy war the EU has been waging beyond its external borders. 
Refugee and migrant exclusion is contracted out, at the very time the UNHCR warns 
that its revenue is insufficient to cover basic food needs in many refugee camps, 
especially in the Middle East region. There were more than 65 million people in 
flight in 2017, a situation worsened by the growing exclusionary and even racist 
policies of the wealthiest states on the planet, including the US, Gulf states and EU 
member states moving to the right. As UNHCR data shows, those who flee to 
Europe are a very tiny fraction of all those forced to remain for years, or decades, in 
neighbouring countries (UNHCR 2018). Jordan, Pakistan, Kenya, Sudan or 
Tanzania, all host refugee camps where refugees live for years, or even generations. 
In those camps, they face deadly diseases, sexual and personal violence and only the 
occasional flicker of hope of third country resettlement. What Greek islands such as 
Lesbos experienced in the summer of 2015 and 2016 was a fraction of the mass 
movement into refugee camps of Kenya, Jordan and Turkey, for example. Yet 
European public opinion was shocked and the Greek state was completely unable to 
cope, even once humanitarian agencies came on board. The refugee crisis was as 
much a crisis of refugee reception as anything else. Yet hostile EU responses to 
Syrian refugees start to make sense when set against the steady drip-drip-drip of the 
longstanding proxy war fought against refugees and migrants for decades already. 
Writing in the South Atlantic Quarterly more than a decade ago, Erik Cazdyn 
(2007) suggested that capitalism, red in tooth and claw, has a tendency to eat its 
own children, as the opening quotation of this article suggests. After many years 
 
  
 
of external military intervention, regime collapse, torture, massacres and assassi- 
nations, the increased use of violence against civilians to resolve disputes in Iraq, 
Libya, Somalia and also in Yemen, the DRC and Syria is not really unexpected. 
With Turkey’s attacks on Kurds in Turkey and Syria, EU member states are now 
finally confronting the possibilities of war spilling over into EU territory, in a way 
not seen since the break-up of the former Yugoslavia in the early to mid-1990s. 
Rising refugee movements are also a barometer of the inability of proxy war to 
offer longer term solutions or ways out of this crisis that has been created. At best 
a proxy war, even on its own brutal terms, can only shift refugees from here to 
there but cannot prevent their movements altogether. Such stop-gap measures do 
not even start to address why so many are on the move, fleeing war, persecution 
and hopelessness. 
 
The Turkish Warrior State and the EU Proxy War 
In January 2018, Turkish ground troops rolled into Afrin, a Kurdish enclave in 
northern Syria, claiming they needed to create a “safe zone” for security purposes, 
in a military operation that ironically was called Operation Olive Branch by 
Ankara (Bilginsoy 2018). Turkish Army Forces and Free Syrian Army troops, 
supported by an air campaign, sought to oust fighters from the Kurdish People’s 
Protection Units (YPG) in and around Afrin. The Turkish President Erdoğan 
claimed that once a “safe zone” was created, they would be able to send home to 
Syria some of the 3.5 million Syrians confined to Turkey by the EU’s refusal to 
allow them admissions. All this was done in the name of “European security”, 
highlighting how proxy war structures the EU’s relations with its neighbours. 
In its recent rhetoric, Turkey has presented itself as useful to Europe’s security 
and even as indispensable. As Turkey drifts away from its post-Cold War rap- 
prochement with Russia and the Middle Eastern states, a worrying trend has 
emerged. The latest attacks on Kurdish areas inside Syria appear to mark a return 
to the security-driven logic that was dominant during the bad old days of the Cold 
War. Now as then, it seems that close allies of the West can do no wrong. And it 
seems that the Turkish regime fully expects the West, if not to approve, then at 
least to ignore its military campaign. Framed as part of a wider anti-terrorism 
strategy in the region, Kurdish forces have been targeted in spite of their pivotal 
role in defeating the Islamic State forces. Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan, suggests that Turkey can help the EU’s wider fight against terrorism by 
stopping onward irregular migration from Syria, constructing a wall at the Syrian 
border to this end. The logic of warfare has been turned against the EU as friends- 
of-convenience, but it has been turned much more lethally against the Kurds. The 
EU is now caught in paying for Turkey to fight its “dirty war” against those  who 
 
  
 
are potential refugees. At the same time, Turkey is settling old scores, in full view 
of the international community, with its own Kurdish minority, and waging its 
own war against the so-called Kurdish “terrorists” in Syria. 
The 2018 attacks were not the first time Erdoğan’s regime used Syrian refugees as 
bargaining chips in their negotiations with the EU. After peace negotiations between 
the government of Turkey and the Kurdish movement collapsed in 2015–2016, the 
Turkish Armed Forces launched their own military “clean up” operations in south- 
east Turkey against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). At the same time, this mili- 
tary campaign targeted the Kurdish Democratic Union Party, part of the opposition 
linked to the PKK. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights reported that 
more than 2,000 civilians were killed in this campaign, and 355,000 became Internally 
Displaced Persons (IDPs) within Turkey (Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights 2017). Several towns, including the historic city of 
Sur, were wiped off the map. 
In seeking to deflect criticism from Europe, the Turkish regime played on the 
role of Turkey in stopping migration towards the EU. The March 2016 EU–Turkey 
refugee deal cost the EU some €6 billion, pledged to Turkey for helping keep 
Syrians in Turkey (Isik 2016). Under this deal, irregular migrants arriving in the 
EU from Turkey were to be returned – and Turkey would police its shores to keep 
them in. Journalists and academics tried to expose the atrocities against Kurdish 
civilians, and how they had been profiled as “terrorists” by the regime. However, 
when they wrote of such things, these journalists and academic too were targeted 
by Turkish authorities and paid a heavy price.2 
The deal was similar to that of Italy and Libya, but on a much grander scale. 
The temptation of the authoritarian regime to “release” refugees in the case of 
conflict of interests with the EU was also similar to Ghaddafi’s decision, at the 
start of the Libya war, to release African migrants from detention and force them 
into boats across the Mediterranean. After Egypt, Libya and Morocco, Turkey is 
the latest country to fully embrace its position as the EU’s external border guard, 
fighting its proxy war. The regime realizes that migrants contained in Turkey will 
be useful to further Turkish interests domestically as well as in its international 
relations and negotiations over EU membership. 
Meanwhile, EU member states like Italy, in the case of Libya, have been will- 
ing to violate their own widely proclaimed human rights norms and to channel 
funds to an authoritarian government that continues to oppress its own people. In 
Turkey, the stakes are as high as in Libya, or higher, since in carrying out an 
asymmetrical war against Kurds both in Turkey and in Syria, the government 
holds Syrian refugees as bargaining chips. If EU criticism becomes too strong, 
Erdoğan has repeatedly threatened to “release” (i.e. force) Syrian refugees back 
into Europe. The Turkish government’s return to Cold War logic has been made 
 
  
 
 
possible by the proxy war that in practice has reinforced concentric rings of 
exclusionary policies towards migrants, around the EU for decades. 
 
The Political Price of Proxy War 
Erdoğan has played the refugee card repeatedly since the deal in 2016. In November 
that year, for example, when the European Parliament voted to freeze negotiations 
on Turkey joining the EU following military attacks on Kurdish areas, he threat- 
ened to unleash refugees on Europe in revenge (McKernan 2016). Playing on the 
fears of the EU, which wants Syrian refugees kept out, the Turkish President 
threatened “if you go any further, these border gates will be opened” (Karadeniz 
and Tattersall 2016). Having called for an end to Turkey’s accession talks, the 
European Parliament was objecting to human rights abuses against opposition 
inside Turkey; the response was to warn of the end of Turkish “goodwill” in con- 
taining refugees on its territory. As well as threatening that Syrians will be allowed 
to leave Turkey, thus “insecuring” an already uncertain Europe (Mitzen 2018), 
Erdoğan has also used his Twitter account to explain to anyone interested, that 
military attacks on Afrin inside Syrian territory are also for the benefit of the EU. 
Unfortunately, the EU member states now seem trapped in a logic of their own 
making, complicit with war crimes and human rights abuses inside Turkey, com- 
mitted ostensibly for EU security purposes. In January 2018, a Brussels repre- 
sentative of the ruling Turkish Justice and Development Party explained, when he 
said of the military attacks, “The operation will lead to the return of Syrian refu- 
gees in Turkey. The fewer refugees in Turkey, the less migrant flow to Europe” 
(AA 2018). It is now being claimed that by “clearing out” Kurdish enclaves, the 
Turkish state can “ensure the safe return of displaced Syrians to their homes” and 
in the long term “curb the flow of terrorist elements and undocumented migrants 
into Europe” (as though they were one and the same thing; Ahmet Aytaç 2018). It 
was claimed by the Turkish government that eventually Operation Olive Branch 
would allow “500,000 refugees to return to Afrin” (Ahmet Aytaç 2018). 
In light of such reassurances that military force would mean fewer refugees 
coming to Europe, the almost total silence of EU leaders and member states about 
Turkey’s military attacks on Afrin, speaks volumes about their complicity. Given 
that the perception of being under threat by “illegal migrants” and “terrorists” is 
shared by the Turkish government and EU member states, the differences between 
them are less in their world views and more in strategy and self-interest. Defined 
in 2003, the premise of the European Security Strategy remains one of “its own 
security as being under threat from ‘illegal migrants’ and terrorism” (EU 2003). 
Turkey’s military operation in Syria against the Kurdish autonomous region – 
which is a threat to Turkey itself – will also help Europe address its own threat. 
 
  
 
 
The news outlet of a pro-regime think-tank, SETA, recently put this in plain terms: 
“If Europe and the EU want to protect their own values, then they should support 
Turkey’s operation” (The New Turkey 2018). As the 2003 EU Security Strategy 
already envisaged, 
 
The integration of acceding states increases our security but also brings the EU 
closer to troubled areas. Our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries 
to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with 
whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations. (8) 
 
This then is the paradoxical consequence of the proxy war on refugees – not a 
safer Europe, but an EU more vulnerable to manipulation by the national interests 
of its closest partners in the proxy war. Turkey in particular – as previously did 
Libya – positioned itself as Europe’s indispensable security provider. This carries 
heightened risks for EU member states who may in future find themselves in court 
for complicity in human rights abuses and war crimes by the Turkish state. Whilst 
pursuing its own divide-and-rule policies to entrench itself politically, the current 
Turkish regime has started attacking Kurdish civilians and anti-ISIS fighters and 
knows it can do so almost with impunity so long as its EU allies depend on it not 
to “release refugees” back into the EU. In this way, the EU itself is no longer a 
“safe zone” towards which Syrians and other refugees can move to find safety 
through Turkey. Once more, as happened in the Balkans decades ago, the EU has 
become complicit in the corralling and containment of vulnerable refugees into 
walled, militarized and ethnically cleansed zones. 
Meanwhile with countries further afield, the EU member states forge “agree- 
ments” to accept returned irregular migrants, most of whom applied for asylum 
and who have been routinely rejected by the “culture of disbelief” operating in 
asylum institutions across the EU. This is a less visible part of the proxy war – the 
forced deportation of tens of thousands of people back to war zones like 
Afghanistan. Whether from Syria, Iraq or sub-Saharan Africa, all are being forced 
back, deported from the EU (Anderson et al. 2013). Webber (2017) describes 
arrangements between the EU and Afghanistan in the following terms: 
 
The Afghanistan deal . . . commits the Afghan government to take back its own 
nationals. It is one of eighteen “non-standard arrangements” for readmission and 
returns which the EU has made since 2008 – eight of which were agreed in 2016. (39) 
 
In this way, using proxy states to effectively wage war on civilians, the EU and its 
member states try to distance themselves from the “dirty work” of forcibly return- 
ing those vulnerable to human rights abuses to unsafe places. They wash their 
 
  
 
hands of the asylum seekers they have rejected, and return them to the very gov- 
ernments that they fear, to face their fate. Their deaths too are uncounted but need 
to be added to the casualties of this multi-dimensional proxy war. EU states pres- 
sure governments and embassies to issue papers, then take no responsibility for the 
outcomes when a person returned is arrested, tortured or killed. 
Seeking to “immunize themselves from legal responsibility for deterrence” 
(Hathaway and Gammeltoft-Hansen 2014: 9) may not prove possible in the longer 
term for the EU and its member states. Continuing to outsource violence and wage 
proxy war against refugees may even expose EU member states, and the EU, to 
substantial risks of future legal prosecution. In 2012, for example, the European 
Court of Human Rights finally ruled that the agreement between Italy and Libya 
contravened Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. “In 2009 alone 
(according to Human Rights Watch and UNHCR), Italy carried out nine pushback 
operations on the high seas, returning 843 Somali, Eritrean and Nigerian nationals to 
Libya”, which is refoulement, illegal under international refugee law (quote from 
Palladino and Gjergji 2016: 4). The court noted that Somalis and Eritreans were 
particularly targeted in these operations by Italy, the former colonizing state 
(Kirchgaessner and Tondo 2018). Yet, a few months after this ruling, Libya was 
receiving indirect support from Italy again to run its migrant detention centres in 
Tripoli and other main cities. 
The prospects are that prosecutions of EU actors responsible for financing the proxy 
war on refugees will continue. Those governments and companies that sell arms and 
border surveillance systems to partners well beyond the EU borders may now risk being 
accused of facilitating repressive border controls. Operating through private companies, 
rather than as state actors, has been one way to try and avoid legal consequences. 
 
Ending EU States’ Impunity for Violent Deaths 
The EU claims to have a proud record of respect for human rights and humanitar- 
ian principles. Yet, the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil 
Protection Office (ECHO) and other EU institutions seem to find it quite accept- 
able to finance institutions like FRONTEX to engage in military policing of EU 
waters. Meanwhile, the EU’s own Guidelines on the funding of humanitarian pro- 
tection specify that member states’ “primary responsibility” is to protect people 
living under their jurisdiction. In situations of armed conflict, all parties, including 
non-state actors, who control a territory and conduct military operations, hold for- 
mal legal protection responsibilities for the people within their territory. This is 
also true of those fighting the proxy war against refugees on the EU’s behalf. The 
first step EU member states could take is to reassert claims that human rights are 
part of the cultural and historical legacy of EU member states (Bilgic 2013). 
 
  
 
 
Italy has found itself in court for its direct intervention in this particular locality of 
the proxy war on migrants. Sometimes, the EU’s proxy war on refugees has even tar- 
geted the humanitarian agencies that seek to help rescue refugees and otherwise protect 
them. In August 2017, Libyan coast guards shot at NGO boats that were rescuing 
migrants from the sea off the Libyan coast, leading these agencies to temporarily put an 
end to their humanitarian operations (Henley and Giuffrida 2017). 
The case of Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy in 2012, where the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled against Italy, was very significant in this respect. 
Having pushed back a group of Eritrean irregular migrants to Libya, the Italian gov- 
ernment claimed this was permitted under the bi-lateral Benghazi Accords between 
the two countries. However the court ruled that Italy’s action was in direct violation 
of Protocol 4 of the European Convention of Human Rights, which had legal prec- 
edence over the Benghazi Accords. This protocol defines and bans “collective 
expulsion”; Italy was guilty. 
Partner countries of the EU like Morocco, Turkey, Kenya or Nigeria should also 
know that if they are involved in acts of violence against those who may be refugees 
and need protection, even if it is on behalf of the EU, and with EU funding and train- 
ing, they may also become legally liable for these human rights violations, which 
could amount to “war crimes”. As Schmitt and Vihul (2014: 57–58) suggest, 
 
. . . customaryinternationallaw . . . capturedbythe International Law Commission 
in its Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
states are responsible for their “internationally wrongful acts” to those whom 
they have “injured” in the sense of violating an obligation owed. 
 
Those they have injured include refugees “contained” for years in camps and pris- 
ons in the Global South, and only a handful need to connect with international 
human rights lawyers, to sue the EU member states that were supposed to protect 
them, and instead fought them through their proxies. 
Right now, EU development cooperation is paying, so that refugees outside 
the EU will be hounded rather than helped or protected. In the name of extrater- 
ritorial border controls, human rights are violated by EU partner countries, on  
the EU’s behalf. Under the Refugee Convention, the cornerstone principle is non-
réfoulement, which requires not sending people back across the border if they 
wish to claim asylum. This principle is being violated routinely. The EU deal 
with Turkey, agreed in 2016, involves summary deportations from Greece, and 
clearly violates non-réfoulement. Somehow, at the same time, 
 
Turkey was declared a “safe third country” for refugees, despite failing to meet 
the criteria for such a designation in the EU’s own Asylum Procedures Directive, 
 
  
 
not least by virtue of its geographical reservation to the 1951 Refugee Convention 
which means that no non-European refugees are officially recognized. (Webber 
2017: 41) 
 
“Swapping” new admissions of those already granted refugee status outside the EU, 
with forced returns to Turkey, is a numbers game that fits within the logic of the 
proxy war being fought on refugees and reflects the grim realities for refugees of 
being caught up in a deterrence-based immigration system (Hintjens et al. 2011). 
Under the 2002 EU Directive and Framework Decision on “Strengthening the 
penal framework to prevent the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and resi- 
dence”, member states should set up measures to prosecute those who help those 
with irregular status. Despite such threats, there are many lawyers, social workers, 
teachers, academics, ordinary community members, neighbours and even MPs 
who reject deterrence. As Liz Fekete has convincingly demonstrated, attacks on 
traffickers and smuggling may be a fairly transparent pretext for creeping crimi- 
nalization of solidarity with refugees and migrants (Fekete 2009). “People who 
help” failed asylum seekers can find themselves prosecuted, even when they are 
family members. The father, Abdallah, of drowned toddler, Alan Kurdi, was even 
accused in absentia, in a Turkish court, of being a smuggler since he was the one 
who had arranged for the boat that would carry his wife and sons to Greece, a boat 
which later sank (Middle East Eye 2016). Increasingly, neighbours, urban resi- 
dents, professional advocates such as lawyers, and doctors or social workers are 
being arrested for helping undocumented people in particular. There are a lot of 
people in EU publics keen to work with refugees, whether in Calais, Lesbos or 
Lampedusa. Whereas we suggest in the rest of this section that the clock is ticking 
for states to be held accountable, at present, it is mainly NGOs and individuals that 
seek to help refugees that are most vulnerable to prosecution. 
Even by rescuing people at sea, one can be accused of assisting or facilitating 
the unauthorized transit or residence of someone who lacks authorization; one is 
redefined as a smuggler. Among those who found themselves arrested in France 
were those citizens who supported refugees stuck in the Calais “Jungle”. 
The more hopeful aspect of all this is that the rapidly transforming situation in 
Europe will not only provoke racism, as was most evidently the case between 
2015 and 2016, but also a tide of reactions against state impunity for the war on 
refugees. In 2015, some EU citizens opened their homes to refugee families, in 
Italy, Greece, the UK, France and the Netherlands. Even in Iceland, refugees were 
welcomed. Some local publics seem to better understand the fundamental princi- 
ples of Article 31 of the 1951 Geneva Convention than governments, namely that 
refugees cannot come with the “proper papers” from the places they flee. General 
immigration  controls  should  not  therefore  apply  to  refugees.  Article  31 also 
 
  
 
explicitly states that penalties cannot be imposed on those forced to enter without 
the proper documents, if the reason they enter is to claim asylum. 
As the proxy war on refugees became more visible, in the course of 2015, more 
people in the EU started to understand immigration controls for what they have 
become – a kind of battle, fought on many fronts. Protests arose against collabora- 
tion with authoritarian regimes that abused the rights of their own civilians and 
refugees alike, such as Erdoğan in Turkey and warlords in Libya. As Frances 
Webber (2017) states, 
 
The EU’s outsourcing of migration controls to the war-torn, violent failed state of 
Libya was widely condemned. Seventy national and international NGOs wrote an 
open letter to EU heads of state and leaders, arguing that it would expose people 
to ill-treatment and arbitrary detention. (44) 
 
So is the worm finally turning? Several recent reports, including one funded by the 
Carnegie Trust, another commissioned by the Dutch government and reports from 
“respectable” human rights organizations, conclude that perhaps the key single 
determinant of smuggling at sea, and the deaths that result from dangerous trans- 
port, especially across the Mediterranean, is the closing down of legal options for 
air travel and entry to Europe, and the restrictive visa policies practised by EU 
member states. Even the usually very moderate IOM agreed with this prognosis in 
a 2014 report entitled Fatal Journeys: Tracking Lives Lost during Migration, and 
they might have added: during flight (IOM 2014). 
Hein de Haas, migration expert at both Oxford University and Maastricht 
University, tried to explain, in the summer of 2015, that human smugglers did not 
create illegal migration – they only responded to restrictions on legal migration by 
governments. He argues that when circular patterns of migration are broken, prob- 
lems result. Interviewed by the media, he responds that “The real crisis is European 
impotence to respond, and it would be outrageous if Europe can’t cope with that 
when the vast majority of refugees are in much poorer countries like Lebanon, 
Jordan and Turkey” (Robins-Early 2015). The failure to respond (or protect), sug- 
gests de Haas, is the main problem among European Union member states. 
 
Concluding Thoughts 
Even if the EU proxy war continues indefinitely, it will not achieve its stated aim 
of making EU citizens – and EU states – feel safer. From the crisis of 2015 
onwards, as the EU proxy war against refugees’ and migrants’ bodies became 
more visible, the need to end it and make progress became more obvious. What 
this article has suggested is that this form of warfare, waged through proxy states 
 
  
 
and security agencies, has not only undermined collective EU claims to legitimacy 
but, by violating shared democratic and human rights norms, exposes EU states to 
charges of state crimes against refugees. Furthermore, we conclude by noting the 
way that abuses of the rights of refugees have a tendency to “ricochet”, undermin- 
ing citizenship rights within the EU as well. As Pickering asks, “. . . what are the 
consequences of policing, deterring and punishing asylum seekers?” (Pickering 
2005: 8). In answer to this, it can be pointed out that “the concept of legitimacy 
provides the link between state deviance and human rights” and is the ultimate test 
of whether states like EU member states can be held accountable for the crimes 
they may commit, in this case against refugees and asylum seekers (quote from 
Green and Ward 2000: 108). As Mitzen (2018) reminds us, efforts to unite to 
police the external borders could be self-defeating since among EU member states 
 
. . . the cultural repertoire in security affairs consists of primitive modes of political 
reaction: othering, stigmization, securitisation of subjectivity. If we look closer at 
them we may see that they actually frustrate the realisation of the EU’s normative 
power. (395) 
 
The proxy war involves EU member states funding and promoting “security solu- 
tions” that “contain” and “deter” migrants along the migration route, but which 
violate international law, which is the foundation of the EU’s special claim to 
constitute a privileged liberal democratic space. This spatial projection of state 
violence from the EU outwards, through the compliance of its “client states”, has 
done deep damage both to the rights of refugees and to the EU’s collective reputa- 
tion as a zone where human rights are protected. 
If EU member states and institutions were at all serious about addressing the 
root causes of refugee flight, they would start by providing more consistent, solid 
financial support for UNHCR refugee protection activities close to countries that 
produce the most refugees, such as Yemen, Syria and Sudan (UNHCR Syria 
2018). After all, EU member states and EU institutions could be held legally liable 
for deaths that have resulted from the proxy war as an aggressive and illegal war. 
Responsibility cannot be avoided for very long; although “the concepts of ‘acting 
on the instructions’ and ‘acting under the direction or control’ of a state have not 
been well-developed in the law of state responsibility” (Schmitt and Vihul 2014: 
61), in future this can change. 
A radical overhaul is needed of EU asylum and visa policies, and starts with rec- 
ognition that deterrence-based border controls are both unjust and unworkable. To 
regain some kind of moral capital, the EU would need to craft policies more in line 
with human rights and humanitarian law. This could prove a more workable basis 
for inter-EU cooperation than the common enemy of a fictitious migrant threat. 
 
  
 
Damage done to the EU’s reputation as a zone of peace, democracy and human 
rights may perhaps be repaired in time. Meanwhile, as a first step, the EU’s own 
Asylum Procedure Directive, discussed earlier in this article, should be respected by 
member states and collectively implemented. Otherwise, the EU and its member 
states lose any claim to embody and defend human rights principles at all. It does 
seem that for some, the hardest part of the proxy war will be ending it. 
By seeking to “deter”, “halt” and “repel” human movement, the EU and its 
member states seem to have embarked on a war they can only lose, and this is for 
two reasons. First of all, they make themselves vulnerable to prosecution for state 
crimes since “international law has been accepted as law by most nations of the 
world”, with the consequences that “violations of these laws are criminal wrongs 
under the existing international legal order” (Kramer and Michalowski 2005: 
447). Secondly, however much development aid is spent and however powerfully 
military and external security solutions are projected beyond EU borders, counter- 
intuitively, the proxy war seems to actually reinforce pressures on refugees to 
move as rapidly as they can, in spite of the enormous risks involved in doing so, 
towards the EU. 
 
Notes 
1. The full details of each case and source of each report are meticulously recorded in UNITED’s list, 
still regularly updated on https://uploads.guim.co.uk/2018/06/19/TheList.pdf (up to 5 May 2018), 
which is sobering reading for those not yet aware of the war inside Europe against refugees, let 
alone the remote control proxy war. 
2. See https://theconversation.com/turkeys-academics-pay-heavy-price-for-resisting-erdogans-militarised- 
politics-54088. 
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